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Abstract
Using a New-Keynesian framework, we investigate how far the
inflationary processes  in member states of EMU cause regional
price levels to converge. We fail to produce hard evidente  of
the present existente  of such  an adjustment mechanism,  not-
withstanding that inflation in some countries tends to converge
towards the euro area level. Overall, inflation persistente  has
declined significantly over the years, but there are stil1 marked
differences between countries on this score. We conclude that
the euro area is not an optimal currency area yet, lending sup-
port to the quest for further structural reforms in European la-
bour and product markets.
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l. Introduction
On January 1, 1999, the currencies of eleven member states of Economie
and Monetary Union  (EMU) became irrevocably fixed. As a consequente,
the nomina1 exchange rate Channel as a propagation mechanism of asymmet-
rit shocks within the euro area was shutdown. Since then, mean-reversion  of
real exchange rates (or international competitiveness) across the euro area
relies  exclusively on convergente  of regional price levels. This paper ad-
dresses the empirical question whether or not such  convergente  is inherent
in the inflationary processes of member states, and if so, how  fast it occurs.
A related issue is the extent to which price dynamics differ between coun-
tries as regards inflation persistente  and the pass-through of changes  in the
real exchange rate and domestic demand pressure. Such  heterogeneity may
render  the common monetary policy conducted by the European Centra1
Bank (ECB) suboptimal for (some) individual countries and is thereby a
potential cause of tension among Goveming Council members of the ECB
(Aksoy et al., 2002). This imposes constraints on fiscal polities,  which are
stil1 in place to cape with regional inflation divergences. However, differ-
ences in national preferences may seriously hamper that kind of accommo-
dating behaviour by sovereign govemments (Hughes Hallett and Weymark,
2001), notwithstanding the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty, the Sta-
bility & Growth Pact, and the Broad Economie  Policy Guidelines.
Of course, such  coordination failure wil1 become less pressing as the real
economies  of member states of EMU get more integrated. This stresses  the
importante  of completing the Intemal Market by ongoing efforts at harmo-
nizing tax and benefit  systems across national borders, at structurally re-
forming labour and product markets,  etc. While this is clearly a long-term
challenge, some progress has been made during the past two decades, which
we try to detect empirically by assessing regional inflation dynamics in the
euro area over different time spans. This also allows US to test the proposi-
tion put forward by Taylor (2000) and others that the shape of the Phillips
curve tends to vary with the inflationary environment.
Our empirical analysis is embedded in a simple New-Keynesian frame-
work, incorporating inertia  - which are commonly seen as characteristic of
European labour and product markets (Gonenc et al., 2000) - and forward-
looking behaviour in the determination of inflation. The focus on regional
price adjustment within a monetary union is fairly navel,  as most of the ex-
isting literature on inflation dynamics concentrates on monetarily sovereign
countries (e.g., in the context of assessing different strategies of monetary
policy). A further innovative aspect of our approach is that we allow and
test for convergente  of expectations to the rate of inflation in the euro area
as a whole. Our evidente  on this score is rather tentative, though, due to
some restrictive  assumptions on expectation formation (especially prior to
the establishment of EMU).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section con-
tains our conceptual framework, which is put to the test empirically in sec-
tion 4, after a discussion of data issues in section 3. Section 5 concludes.
2. Conceptual framework
Our starting point is an expectations-augmented Phillips curve as contain-
ed in the work of Svensson (1998) and Leitemo and Söderström (2001)
with domestic inflation  predetermined one period:
x, = ux,-, + (1 -a) E,&+,) + p E,-,(Y,) - Y E,-,(e,)  + 6 + Et (1)
Olall; p o ;  y<o
where x,  is the annualized domestic rate of inflation, measured as the differ-
ence of the (log) gdp-deflator (p,), yt  is the output gap, e,  is the (log) real
exchange rate,  a,  is a white-noise supply shock, and E is an expectations op-
erator. The suffix t indicates  the (quarterly) time period. The expectations of
yt  and e,,  formed in period t-1, should be regarded as deviations from their
steady-state levels, which are assumed to be constant and to be captured by
the intercept 6 for convenience. The real exchange rate is defined as:
e,  =s, +p t -p,’ (2)
where s, is the (log) spot exchange rate (in units of foreign currency per unit
of domestic currency), and pt* is the foreign (log) gdp-deflator. The pa-
rameters a,  p,  y and 6 may differ across countries. Of course, they may also
change over time due to shifts in wage negotiation models, opening-up of
product markets (both domestically and across borders), and so on.
For a theoretical underpinning of eq. (1)  we refer to Svensson (1998,
Appendix C). He derives a macroeconomic supply function from a first-or-
der condition  of an optimization problem for an open economy, adding in-
flation persistente  along the lines of Fuhrer and Moore (1995). This last ex-
tension gives the equation its ‘Keynesian’ flavour of price-staggering, which
has recently been worked out by Taylor (2000) and Choudri and Hakura
(2001) in the context of marginal tost  and exchange rate pass-through.
To see what EMU implies, consider the more extreme case in which s is
completely fixed. Then, the real exchange rate in eq. (1) acts as an equili-
brating mechanism in that it incites inflation as long as the domestic price
leve1 is expected to lag behind the foreign price leve1 (provided, of course,
that y < O).’ As a consequente,  intemational price leve1 differences are only
temporary. Clearly, it depends on the strength of the real exchange rate
Channel (i.e., on r) and on domestic inflation dynamics (notably a) how  long
that adjustment process  takes. The more integrated and dynamic  the real
economies  of countries are as regards product market competition, wage rate
determination and so on, the sooner equilibrium wil1 be restored.
We intend to shed some light on this issue in the context of EMU by esti-
mating eq. (1) for five larger member states. This requires that certain as-
sumptions be made on the formation of expectations about future inflation.
the output gap and the real exchange rate.  We assume that y,  and e, are ex-
pected to converge to their constant steady-state levels (7 and ë) according
to the adaptive mechanisms:
’ Note that the real exchange rates  of member states of EMU (e) are stil1 sub-
ject to changes  in nomina1 exchange rates  vis-a-vis the currencies of countries out-
side  the euro area.
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Et-,(Y,)  = KY,-,  + (1  -K)y (0 5 K< 1) (3)
Et-,@,)  = het-, - (1 -Vë (0 I hi 1) (4)
Note that expectations are static  in case K = h = l.* The expectation of one-
period ahead inflation in each member state  of EMU is assumed to converge
to the expectation of one-period ahead infiation  in the euro area as a whole,
Et-,(IJ+,),  according to:
Et-,@,+J  = CI~, - (1 -PI E,-,O-J+,) (OSpI 1) (5)
This is asymptotically consistent with the aforementioned hypothesis that re-
gional price leve1 differences within EMU tend to disappear in the long run.
The persistente  coefficients K, h and u may differ across  countries, just hke
(or rather  in conjunction with) the parameters in eq. (1). Finally, we assume
that one-period ahead inflation in the euro area as a whole is expected to
converge to the constant rate lI’, representing the rate of inflation the Euro-
pean (system of) centra1 banks consider(s) to be consistent with medium-
term price stability:
Et-,W,+,>  = vQ_, - (1 -v>n* (0 I v I 1) (6)
Upon substituting eqs. (3) to (6) into eq. (l),  we arrive at the final esti-
mating form:
n, = q q-, + a2&, + P’ yt-,  + ?i e,-, + 6’ + q (7)
0 I a,  = a + p - ap 5 1 ; 0 5 a, = (1 -a,)v  I 1 ; p’ = PK ;
y = yh ; 6’ = 6 + p<1  -K)y + y(l -h)ë + (1 -a,)(l -v)l-I*
From the parameter restrictions, it follows that a, + a, 5 1. The larger a,
(hence, the smaller a,)  and the smaller -)’  are, the more persistent domestic
2 We have explored more complicated schemes by adding  several lagged differ-
ence terms to the equations (Ay,.,  and Ae,-,  respectively), but on the whole, this gave
inferior estimation results.
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inflation is, and the longer  it takes until the country3  price competitiveness
is at par vis-a-vis other member states after it has been hit by an asymmetrie
supply shock (E). Thus,  the estimates of a,,  a, and 1/,  taken in conjunction,
tel1 US to what extent national economies  in EMU have really integrated.
Incidentally, the significante  of the domestic output gap (i.e., the parameter
p’) is also indicative  of the degree of economie  regionalism in inflation
dynamics.
3. Data issues
We have obtained quarterly data from Datastream, covering  the period
1980-2000, for France,  Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. Lack of
consistent data over a sufficiently  long period prevented US from considering
other member states of EMU as well. Inflation in the euro area is a weighted
average of the gdp-deflators for the constituent countries, with the euro area
prior to the establishment of EMU represented by the group of countries
participating in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism.3 We have experi-
mented with several indicators of the output gap: deviations of real gdp from
trend, constructed by a HP( 1600) filter, the rate of capacity utilization, the
unemployment rate and its inverse. The last proxy, implying a hyperbolic
Phillips curve, tumed out  to be superior throughout the sample of countries.
Forced by the (un)availability of data, we had to measure the real exchange
rate in terms of either consumer price deflators or unit labour costs,  where
we would have preferred gdp-deflators.
Unit-root tests (both Augmented Dickey-Fuller  and Phillips-Perron) show-
ed for each country that al1 but one series are stationary. The exception is
the real exchange rate based on unit labour costs,  which led US to choose the
real exchange rate based on consumer price deflators as our measure of
intemational competitiveness. So, the preferred data set is consistent with
Svensson’s (2001) prior that al1 variables in eq. (1) are stationary.
3 The obvious altemative is to identify  II prior to 1999 with German inflation,
but this gave implausible estimation results.
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Studies by Gonenc et al. (2000) and Rich and Tracey (2000) suggest that
the persistente  of domestic inflation is not lùlly captured by simply includ-
ing the quarterly lagged rate of inflation (rc,,)  as a regressor. The reason is
that wage developments (especially in Europe) are largely govemed by col-
lective labour agreements that are effective during a relatively long period of
time. Following Rudebusch (2000), we have experimented with more
complicated lag structures,  and established that using lags of up to and in-
cluding eight quarters fits best for the countries considered.4  This confirms
the notion of Fuhrer and Moore (1995),  elaborating on Taylor (1980),  that
wage inertia  extending over several quarters tend to translate into equally
severe inflation persistente.
4. Estimation results
Eq. (7) was fitted over the entire sample period (1980-2000) and over the
subperiod 1990-2000, for each country separately and for a panel of the five
countries. We used OLS (and SUR for the panels), with the covariance ma-
trix estimated by the method suggested by Newey and West (1987) to allow
for ARCH effects  found in some equations. The results are recorded in table
1, together with some summary statistics.
As it tums out,  inflation in most countries considered is primarily driven
by past inflation rates,  with the real exchange rate playing a very limited
role (if any).  This conclusion holds for both sample periods.5  As revealed
by the results of the pooled regressions (with only 6’ allowed to vary across
countries), the pass-through of changes in the real exchange rate to domestic
inflation has even declined over time (though not significantly). Recent re-
search by Taylor (2000) and others (Choudry and Hakura, 2001; Gagnon and
Ihrig, 2001) suggests that this is due to a shift towards an environment of
lower inflation, whether or not induced by monetary policy. The argument
4 Al1 pre-testing results are available from the authors upon  request.
5 In the longer  sample, f is significant for France,  but it has the wrong sign.
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runs as follows. The extent to which firms pass through tost  increases as
wel1 as price increases at competing firms depends on their expectations
about the persistente  of such  increases. This perceived persistente  is associ-
ated with the overall leve1 of inflation, which is assurned to be indicative  of
the pricing power of firms. And indeed, as appears from the last column of
table 1, average inflation has decreased markedly in most countries consid-
ered. Moreover, we find that the influence of domestic demand pressure on
inflation (i.e., the parameter p’) has declined significantly over the years in
France, Italy and the Netherlands, which also supports Taylor’s hypothesis.
Remarkably, this is not revealed by the results of the pooled regressions,
suggesting that the assumption of constant slope coefficients  across  countries
is not entirely appropriate. It follows that national economies  in EMU are
not perfectly integrated as regards price (and wage) formation, which cor-
roborates recent findings by Aksoy et al. (2002).
Notwithstanding this last conclusion, inflationary expectations in some
countries - Germany in particular - were based more and more on aver-
age European inflation as EMU got nearer. This emerges from a comparison
of the estimates of ct,  and a, between the two samples.6  Spain is found to
be most oriented towards Europe in this regard, already  from the 1980s
onward, which is probably due to the fact  that this country has the strongest
trade links with the rest of the euro area. Inflation persistente  in France and
Italy has remained considerable  through the years. It is beyond the scope of
this paper to go deeply into the possible causes  behind this finding.  We do
note, however, that those countries have the highest scores on product mar-
ket regulation in our sample, according to a recent study by the OECD (Ni-
coletti et al., 2001, pp. 43-44). This may have a bearing on the viability of
indexation and, hence, on price staggering. The Netherlands, on the other
hand, seems to have moved towards pretty sound inflation dynamics. The
6 Although the sum of these parameters exceeds unity  in some cases, thereby
breaching the theoretical restriction, it does only significantly so in the case of
Spain in the longer  sample (according to a Wald test). Furthermore, we had to re-
ject  the hypothesis that v in eq. (6) is uniform across  countries.
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most recent estimates of a,  and cr2  for the Netherlands imply that Dutch in-
flation is largely governed by the perception  of medium-term price stability
in the euro area (i.e., by II’).  Hence, the effects  of exogenous price shocks
on inflation tend to be short-lived in the Netherlands.
5. Concluding remarks
This study was primarily inspired by curiosity about the degree and speed
of price leve1 convergente  across  EMU, after a member state has been hit
by an asymmetrie  supply shock. Our finding that regional inflation rates in
the euro area are not significantly affected by deviations of real exchange
rates from their steady-state levels does not bode wel1 for a spontaneous -
let alone rapid - convergente.  It follows that stationarity of real exchange
rates in our sample of countries is conditional on the possibility of adjust-
ments in nomina1 exchange rates.  Since this flexibility does not exist within
EMU, differences in price competitiveness between member states may last
for quite a long time. This is the more so as there are stil1 marked differ-
ences in inflationary dynamics - hence, in the propagation of shocks - be-
tween member states of EMU, which fiu-ther  complicate  the pursuit of a
common monetary policy. These findings lead US to conclude that the euro
area is not an optimal currency area yet, lending support to the quest for
infla-
tion dynamics, especially where the formation of expectations is concerned.
The results are also prone to the Lucas critique. Indeed, the empirical evi-
dence produced in this paper supports the view of Taylor (2000) and others
that the inflationary environment tends to alter the shape of the Phillips
curve. It may wel1 be, therefore, that the influence of real exchange rates
(and other factors)  on regional inflation levels wil1 increase in the unlikely
event that the euro area runs into persistently higher  inflation zones.
’ See Hughes Hallett and Weymark (2001) for a theoretical underpinning  of this
proposition.
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Table 1
Estimation result$
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Spain
Pooled
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Spain
Pooled
0.90 0.02
(20.3) (0.4)
0.78 0.09
(8 .7 )  ( 1 .2 )
0.94 -0.01
(15.7) (0.1)
0.76 0.11
(6 .7 )  ( 1 .5 )
0.51 0.80
(3 .8 )  ( 3 .3 )
0.91 0.08
(52.2) (3.0)
S a m p l e 1980-2000
0.11 0.03 -3.83
(2.2) (1.9) (2.7)
0.03 -0.00 -0.04
(1.6) (0.1) (0.0)
0.28 -0.00 -1.89
(2.1) (0.2) (0.8)
0.05 -0.02 0.85
(3.4) (0.6) (0.3)
0.28 -0.04 2.63
(1.3) (1.6)
0.02 -0.01
‘tb’
(2 .6 )  ( 1 . 5 )
S a m p l e 1990-2000
0.87 0.00 0.07 0.02 -2.14
(3.5) (0.0) (1.0) (0.5) (0.6)
0.57 0.47 0.02 0.03 -3.09
(5.2) (2.8) (0.3) (1.2) (1.3)
0.91 0.27 -0.19 -0.02 3.93
(8.7) (1.1) (0.8) (0.9) (1.0)
0.14 0.14 0.02 -0.05 5.65
(0.8) (2.5) (1.4) (1.6) (1.9)
0.42 0.81 0.31 -0.03 2.04
(1.4) (2.0) (1.0) (0.7) (0.4)
0.72 0.23 0.03 0.00 -c
(12.8) (6.0) (2.6) (0.2)
0.98
0.91
0.98
0.78
0.85
0.96
0.51 3.89
0.47 2.44
0.80 7.33
0.80 2.06
1.21 6.80
0.86 4.75
0.87 0.32 1.67
0.92 0.48 2.17
0.91 0.67 4.29
0.55 0.43 2.12
0.63 1.25 4.45
0.84 0.80 2.94
a T-ratios in brackets;  R2  is the coeffïcient of determination and S, is the standard
error of estimate, both adjusted for degrees of freedom; ?t  is the sample mean of
gdp-infIation.
b Varies across countries (Fr: 0.65; Ge: 0.41; It: 1.10; Nl: 0.42: Sp: 0.99).
’ Varies across countries (Fr: -0.61; Ge: -0.58; It: 0.07; Nl: -0.70: Sp: 0.26).
